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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper explains why domestic debt composition in emerging economies is risky. It carries 
out an analysis of the determinants of ‘domestic’ original sin, which refers to the inability of 
emerging economies to borrow domestically in local currency, at long maturities and fixed 
interest rates. The latter is a measure of financial vulnerabilities arising from domestic debt 
composition, which encompasses maturity mismatches, rollover risk and interest payment 
contingency. The paper builds on a large dataset compiled by the authors from national sources. 
It finds that domestic original sin is severe when inflation is lofty, the debt service-to-GDP ratio 
high, the slope of the yield curve inverted and the investor base narrow. These results suggest 
that sound macroeconomic policies, attractive long-term yields and policies aimed at widening 
the investor base are instrumental to reduce domestic debt riskiness and tilt its composition 
towards safer, long-term, unindexed, local currency instruments. 
 
JEL Classification: F34; F41; G15 
Key words: Original sin, domestic debt, emerging economies 
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There is growing awareness that a major reason why emerging economies are more prone to financial 
crises than mature economies is the atypical composition of their debt. Many emerging economies are 
bound indeed to borrow in foreign currency, short-term or at indexed interest rates. In this respect, 
literature has focused mainly on external debt composition, especially the inability of emerging 
economies to borrow in international capital markets in their domestic currency, the so-called 
international dimension of “original sin”. However, domestic debt has become increasingly 
instrumental in assessing the financial vulnerability of emerging economies owing to its sheer size and 
swift growth. This paper explains why domestic debt composition in some emerging economies is also 
risky. To this end, it carries out a systematic analysis of the determinants of the so-called “domestic” 
original sin, which refers to the inability of emerging economies to borrow domestically in local 
currency, at long maturities and fixed interest rates. As such, the latter is a measure of financial 
vulnerabilities arising from domestic debt composition, which encompasses maturity mismatches, 
rollover risk and interest payment contingency.  
The paper relies on a new dataset, constructed by the authors from national statistics on domestic 
government debt, to measure domestic original sin in 33 countries over 1994-2004. This dataset 
contains a relatively large number of observations, which helps address the limitations of the small 
samples used in previous literature. Based on these new data, an additional strength of the paper is to 
carry out the first empirical analysis of the determinants specific to domestic original sin highlighted in 
related literature.  
The key results of the paper is to show that domestic original sin is particularly severe when inflation is 
lofty, the debt service-to-GDP ratio high, the slope of the yield curve inverted and the investor base 
narrow. These results are robust to the inclusion of controls, to specification changes, to various 
definitions of the variables, as well as to the choice of the estimator, including when correcting for 
endogeneity. An exception is the debt service-to-GDP ratio, whose causal impact is not ascertained. 
Interestingly, unlike Hausmann and Panizza (2003), we do not find robust evidence that countries that 
have capital controls also have lower domestic original sin. The difference between our results and 
theirs is likely to be explained by the much larger size of our sample of observations.  
From a policy perspective, our results suggest that sound macroeconomic policies (on the monetary 
front, in particular), attractive long-term yields and a wider investor base are instrumental to overcome 
domestic original sin. In particular, bringing down inflation in a context of diminishing debt service and 
5
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 560
December 2005upward-sloping yield curve, together with policies aimed at widening the investor base (such as reforms 
of the domestic capital markets and pension system), help reduce domestic debt riskiness and tilt its 
composition towards safer, long-term, unindexed, local currency instruments. The road to redemption 
is not necessarily long. Emerging economies can – and did so in the past – improve their domestic debt 
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1   Introduction 
There is growing awareness that a major reason why emerging economies are more prone to financial 
crises than mature economies is the atypical composition of their debt. Many emerging economies 
are bound indeed to borrow in foreign currency, short-term or at indexed interest rates. In this 
respect, literature has focused mainly on external debt composition, especially the inability of 
emerging economies to borrow in international capital markets in their domestic currency, the so-
called international dimension of “original sin”.1  
However, domestic debt has also become increasingly instrumental in assessing the financial 
vulnerability of emerging economies owing to its sheer size and swift growth. Indeed, some of the 
major financial crises affecting emerging economies in recent years have been linked to risky 
domestic debt composition pertaining to, inter alia, maturity mismatches, rollover risks and 
contingent interest payments. In particular, excessive reliance on short-term domestic paper, namely 
the Tesobonos and the GKOs, was considered as one of the major sources of vulnerability in the 
Mexican crisis of 1995 and the Russian crisis of 1998. Two of the largest sovereign defaults (Russia in 
1998 and Argentina in 2002) involved domestic liabilities in local currency. For these reasons, risky 
domestic debt composition in emerging economies is increasingly high on the policy agenda. This 
growing policy interest is reflected in the initiative of eleven central banks and monetary authorities in 
the East Asia and Pacific region to launch in 2004 an ‘Asian Bond Fund’, with a view to investing in 
Asian bonds denominated in domestic currency and developing domestic markets. 
Against this background, the domestic dimension of original sin, namely the inability of emerging 
economies to borrow domestically in local currency at long maturities and fixed interest rates, which 
makes domestic debt composition risky, has received little attention. The literature on risky domestic 
debt composition in emerging economies remains scant, indeed, and data availability is poor. 
Hausmann and Panizza (2003) examine financial vulnerabilities arising from domestic original sin. 
They find that monetary credibility, as measured by lower inflation and the imposition of capital 
controls, helps explain domestic original sin. However, their empirical analysis is based on a 
theoretical framework originally developed to explain international original sin only and on a small 
sample of 21 country-observations. Borensztein et al. (2004) review some of the determinants of 
domestic debt composition in emerging economies, including the credibility of monetary and fiscal 
                                                 
1 See Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999), Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003a) and (2003b) for stylised 
facts; Hausmann and Panizza (2003) on empirical determinants; Bordo, Meissner and Redish (2003) as well as 
Flandreau and Sussman (2004) for historical evidence; McKinnon and Schnabl (2004) for implications with 
regard to reserve accumulation and orientation of exchange rate policies to the US dollar in East Asia; 
Zettelmeyer and Jeanne (2002) as well as Tirole (2003) for implications with regard to international lending; 
Eichengreen and Hausmann (2005) for a comprehensive overview. 
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policies, the size of the investor base and considerations relating to political economy. However, they 
provide no formal analysis of their statistical significance.2 
The contribution of this paper is to present comprehensive evidence on the riskiness of domestic 
debt composition and its determinants. To this end, the paper relies on a new dataset, constructed by 
the authors from national statistics on domestic government debt, to measure domestic original sin in 
33 countries over 1994-2004. This dataset contains a relatively large number of observations, which 
helps address the limitations of the small samples used in previous literature. Based on these new 
data, an additional strength of the paper is to carry out the first empirical analysis of the determinants 
specific to domestic original sin highlighted in previous literature. The key results of the paper is to 
show that domestic original sin is particularly severe when inflation is lofty, the debt service-to-GDP 
ratio high, the slope of the yield curve inverted and the investor base narrow. The bulk of these 
results are robust to the inclusion of controls, to specification changes, to various definitions of the 
variables, as well as to estimator choice, including when correcting for endogeneity. 
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 presents the salient features of domestic 
debt in emerging economies and of domestic original sin. Section 3 reviews the main theoretical 
determinants of the latter. Section 4 introduces the methodology and the data. Section 5 presents the 
results and section 6 draws the policy implications of the paper. 
 
2 Stylised  facts 
2.1 Domestic debt 
Although external debt has been the long-standing focus of investors and academics alike, domestic 
debt is becoming the major source of funding in emerging economies, both for sovereigns and 
corporations. Domestic debt security markets have grown markedly over the last decade. Late 2004, 
the stock of domestic debt securities issued by residents of the emerging economies reporting data to 
the BIS reached USD 2.8 trillion and was four times larger than the corresponding amount of 
international debt securities (USD 0.7 trillion) (Chart 1).3 Therefore, from a sheer market size 
perspective, the domestic dimension of original sin is possibly more important than its international 
dimension.4  
 
                                                 
2 Moreover, in the finalisation of this paper, we have become aware of an ongoing project by Olivier Jeanne at 
the IMF aiming at collecting data on and explaining the structure of government debt in emerging economies. 
3 See Table 1 for a list of the countries reporting data to the BIS. 
4 Interestingly, as some observers have already put it “[A] problem with the original sin measure of mismatch is 
that it would restrict attention to international bonds […]. It therefore ignores the currency composition and 
increasing importance of the domestic bond market” (Goldstein and Turner, 2004). 
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Not only are domestic debt markets large, but they are growing swiftly, which underscores a gradual 
process of financial deepening in emerging economies. Indeed, relative to GDP, the stock of 
domestic debt securities issued by emerging economies has almost doubled in the last ten years, to 
reach close to 40% in 2004 (Chart 2). Marked regional differences remain, however. Emerging 
Europe (including here the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia) has the least developed 
market for domestic debt securities relative to economic size, with one-fifth of GDP. Interestingly, 
the latter were most developed in three Middle-East and African countries, standing at about half of 
GDP, namely: Lebanon (one of the major financial centres in the Mediterranean), Turkey and South 
Africa. 
 
Chart 2: Ratio of the amount outstanding of domestic debt securities 
to nominal GDP
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Having said, relative to total market size, emerging Asia remained the largest market for domestic 
debt securities issued in emerging economies, accounting for about two-thirds of the total stock of 
such securities late 2004 (Table 1). It was followed by Latin America, with about one-fifth thereof 
and emerging Europe and the Middle-East and Africa, with around 8-9% each. With regard to issuer 
types, governments made up for around two-thirds of the debt securities issued in emerging 
economies, against one-fifth for financial institutions and about 13% for corporations. Emerging 
Asia stands here again as an exception, with both financial institutions and corporations accounting 
for close to half of the amount outstanding of domestic debt securities issued in the region. 
 
Table 1: Main characteristics of domestic debt security markets in emerging economies
(USD billion) (As a %)
Government Financial 
institutions
Corporations All issuer 
types
Emerging Asia
a 1,685 61.5 55.8 26.3 17.9 100.0
Latin America
b 594 21.7 79.1 14.1 6.9 100.0
Emerging Europe
c 211 7.7 94.7 2.9 2.3 100.0
Middle-East & Africa
d 251 9.2 91.5 3.8 4.7 100.0
All emerging economies 2,741 100.0 67.1 19.8 13.1 100.0
Source: BIS. Data as at the third quarter of 2004.
a China, Hong-Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand.
b Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
c Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Slovakia.
d Lebanon, South Africa and Turkey.
Amount outstanding, all issuer 
types
Breakdown by issuer type
(As a % of the regional amount outstanding)
 
The development of domestic debt security markets in emerging economies since the mid-1990’s has 
tended to reflect efforts of many of these economies to self-insure against ‘sudden stops’ and 
reversals in international capital flows. From a macroeconomic perspective indeed, domestic debt 
markets are seen as an alternative source of financing, which helps soften the impact of a loss of 
access to external funding (IMF, 2003). Moreover, from a microeconomic perspective, deeper 
domestic debt security markets help widen the menu of instruments available to address currency and 
maturity mismatches, thereby contributing to reducing risks of financial crises. By the same token, 
they are additionally expected to help stimulate domestic savings and attract international investors 
through provision of a larger spectrum of financial instruments available for portfolio diversification.  
For all these reasons, local authorities have engaged in deliberate efforts to develop debt security 
markets, occasionally without immediate fiscal needs (IMF, 2002). They have endeavoured to 
establish benchmark yield curves to facilitate the pricing of corporate securities. They have organised 
regular programs for government bond and treasury bill issuance. They have unified multiple issues 
into standardised treasury bonds. The deepening of government bond markets has been in some 
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instances supported by strong institutional development. For example, public debt management 
agencies – often employing staff with investment banking and trading experience – have been 
established and trading, clearing and settlement systems have been improved. Reforms of the 
domestic pension systems and of the capital markets have further contributed to a deepening of 
domestic debt security markets by stimulating the growth of a local base of institutional investors. 
More recently, growing interest from international investors in emerging economies’ local markets 
has buttressed the development of their domestic debt security markets. In the current environment 
of historically low interest rates and ‘hunt for yield’, overstretched valuations in the international 
bond markets have enticed international investors to venture further out the credit spectrum. 
International investments in domestic bonds issued by emerging economies have increased markedly. 
For instance, in the most open economies, such as Mexico, Turkey and Poland, the share of non-
resident holdings of domestic government bonds in local currency has doubled in the last two years, 
to reach about 10%, 20% and 25%, respectively. Moreover, a regular survey of investors carried out 
by the Emerging Market Trade Association suggests that the trading volume in secondary markets in 
domestic bonds, as a percentage of total trade volume, has risen from 25% in 1997 to 45% in 2004, 
now outpacing trading in international bonds (IMF, 2005). An increasing number of sovereigns have 
received a rating on their domestic debt from international agencies (Packer, 2003). The 
unprecedented enthusiasm of international investors for emerging local markets was echoed last June 
by the launch of the first local emerging market index by JP Morgan, which aims at facilitating the 
benchmarking of mutual funds dedicated to these assets (JP Morgan, 2005). In line with the ‘low 
bond yield conundrum’ globally, yields on domestic bonds issued by emerging sovereigns have also 
reached historical lows. 
Relatedly, Latin American issuers have also been taking on a leading role in the recent development 
of a local currency bond segment issued by emerging economies internationally. This marks the first 
milestone towards redemption from the international dimension of original sin, namely the inability 
of emerging economies to borrow in their currency in international markets. In this respect, 
sovereigns (Uruguay, Colombia and Argentina) and corporates (mostly Brazilian banks) alike have 
been active in the recent period. 
2.2 Domestic original sin 
While domestic debt security markets have tended to develop overall, the extent and evolution of 
domestic original sin has remained markedly different across emerging economies. Breakdowns of 
domestic debt securities are publicly available from the BIS by issuer and maturity type only (not by 
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coupon or currency type).5 As a result, the main source of information on domestic original sin has 
been JP Morgan’s Guide to Local Markets (1998, 2000 and 2002 issues; see papers by Eichengreen et 
al.’s, as well as Borensztein et al., 2004). For each year, this report provides a snapshot of information 
on domestically-traded public debt for twenty-two emerging economies, including data on amounts 
outstanding of domestic government bonds as well as their main characteristics (total amount, 
maturity, currency and coupon type). Issues are divided into five categories: long-term domestic 
currency fixed rate; short-term domestic currency fixed rate; long-term (or short-term) domestic 
currency debt indexed to an interest rate; long-term domestic currency debt indexed to prices; and 
foreign currency debt. Domestic original sin (DSIN) is defined as the complement of the share of 
long-term domestic debt in local currency with a fixed interest rate in the total stock of domestic 
debt: 
 
debt   domestic Total 
rate  interest  fixed a    with currency  local    debt in   domestic   term Long 
1− = DSIN  (1) 
 
so that DSIN = 0 indicates absence of original sin and DSIN = 1 indicates maximal original sin.6 
Sources of financial vulnerability arising from domestic debt composition include: 
•  Rollover risk. Excessive reliance on short-term debt exposes borrowers to default risk, if 
debt cannot be rolled over, or to possibly increasing debt service costs, if interest rates have 
risen prior to refinancing. Excessive short-term borrowing may further limit the ability of the 
central bank to increase policy rates in order to fight inflationary pressures or support the 
exchange rate, owing to concerns as to the implied impact on borrowers’ short-term 
financial position; 
•  Maturity and currency mismatches. Excessive reliance on short-term debt additionally 
exposes borrowers to liquidity risk if their assets are illiquid. Foreign currency denomination 
of domestic debt gives rise to balance sheet mismatches if the bulk of revenues and/or assets 
are in local currency, with potentially adverse consequences in case of exchange rate 
devaluation; 
                                                 
5 As only data on domestic loans in foreign currency are available from the BIS, the paper – in line with the 
literature on the international dimension of original sin – focuses on debt securities, leaving aside loans. The 
bias arising from this restriction is unlikely to be large, however. Although financial systems in emerging 
economies are regarded as bank-dominated traditionally, debt securities have become the mainstay of domestic 
and external finance of these economies (IMF, 2003). 
6 This is the strictest definition of domestic original sin. There are other – looser – definitions (see e.g. 
Hausmann and Panizza, 2003). 
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•  Contingency of interest payments. Indexation – either to an interest rate, a price index or a 
foreign currency – renders liabilities uncertain and possibly increasing in bad times (IMF and 
World Bank, 2003). In addition, inflation-linked or foreign currency-linked debt securities, 
while contributing to complete and deepen financial markets, may make indexation difficult 
to reverse and spill over to labour markets, ultimately making inflation more persistent and 
costly (IMF, 2003). 
By contrast, borrowing in local currency at long maturities and fixed rates helps reduce currency and 
maturity mismatches, rollover and indexation risks. 
Hausmann and Panizza (2003) estimate (1) for the three years for which they have data from JP 
Morgan. 7  They take its average value on the grounds that original sin is stable over time and caution 
against over-interpreting their econometric results, as they are based on a small sample of up to 21 
country-observations. For this reason, we provide new estimates of (1) by enlarging the country 
coverage and adding a time dimension to the data. Estimates are based on statistics on the 
composition of the stock of central government debt for 33 countries, as available from national 
sources. As can been seen from the statistical appendix, which reports the sources and definitions, 
extensive data collection work was needed, occasionally involving security-by-security checks.8 
Additional data quality checks were carried out using the BIS’s databases on domestic debt securities. 
Our estimates are available since 1994 for half the countries in the sample (Argentina, Chile, the 
Czech Republic, Egypt, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Korea, Lithuania, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Russia, Singapore, Slovenia and Thailand), 1995-2004 for Taiwan, 1995-2002 for Slovakia, 1997-2004 
for Latvia and Poland, 1997-2003 for Croatia, 1998-2004 for Turkey, 1999-2004 for Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Indonesia, Israel, the Philippines, South Africa, Uruguay and Venezuela, 2001-2004 for Colombia 
and 2002-2004 for Peru. 
Our new (time-varying) estimates of domestic original sin are comparable with previous (time-
invariant) estimates found in the literature (Table 2).9  
                                                 
7 See also Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003a) and Eichengreen and Hausmann (2005) where the 
estimates are also reported. 
8 Admittedly, our data - like those used by Eichengreen et al. – do not include private bond issues. However, 
the resulting bias is unlikely to be large for most emerging economies, as debt security issuance by financial 
institutions and corporations is limited, with the important exception of some of the emerging Asian 
economies. 
9 The only exception is Malaysia where Hausmann and Panizza (2003) found that domestic original sin is 
maximal, in contrast with our estimates, which suggest that it is low. This discrepancy likely results from 
inaccuracies in JP Morgan’s data. Indeed, according to the Malaysian central bank, the coupon rate of the 
Malaysian government securities (MGS) with a maturity above one year is determined by the weighted average 
of the successful yield, thereby fixed. Security-by-security data, also available from the central bank, confirm 
that the coupon rate of government bonds, once determined, does not change over time. This is additionally 
confirmed by the Bloomberg pages available for MGS issues, which indicate that their coupon is fixed. 
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With the exception of Colombia, economies characterised by high domestic original sin (i.e. close to 
1) include Croatia, Turkey and Latin American economies (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, 
Venezuela). This is particularly severe when compared to mature economies, such as the euro area, 
where the share of money market instruments and bonds with a variable interest rate in the total 
amount of government debt securities stands at about 0.10 only (Wolswijk and de Haan, 2005). 
Conversely, Asian economies (such as Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand) are 
characterized by a safe domestic debt composition, together with South Africa. The evolution of the 
phenomenon, which is shown here for the first time, suggests that some countries have managed to 
reduce sizably the riskiness of their domestic debt composition. In particular, the latter has 
approximately halved from a peak reached in the mid-1990’s in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Poland, in the run-up to EU accession. The most striking 
example remains Russia, where domestic debt composition, highly risky in the mid-1990s, became 
safer after 1998, which is partly linked to a restructuring of the country’s debt after its default.10 Many 
countries have managed to place issues at the very long end of the yield curve, with tenors extending 
to the 15-year maturity in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Singapore, against 20 years for Poland 
and South Africa and even 25 years for the Philippines. 
 
                                                 
10 Late 1998, the government announced a novation (i.e. a substitution of a new for an old debt) of the GKOs 
and OFZs on which payments were frozen since the summer of that year (IMF, 1999). 
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(End-of-period values)




Argentina 0.72 0.78 0.76 0.79 0.80 0.86 0.93 0.97 0.99 ... ... 1.00
Brazil ... ... ... ... ... 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.92
Bulgaria ... ... ... ... ... 0.84 0.57 0.49 0.36 0.38 0.35 ...
Chile 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.86 0.81 1.00
Colombia ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 0.67 0.69 0.63 0.56 ...
Croatia ... ... ... 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 ... ...
Czech Republic 0.46 0.50 0.59 0.55 0.59 0.63 0.61 0.56 0.42 0.34 0.22 0.59
Egypt 0.48 0.40 0.41 0.45 0.52 0.39 0.38 0.24 0.27 0.29 ... 0.79
Estonia ... ... ... ... ... 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.25 ... ...
Hong Kong 0.84 0.76 0.77 0.72 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.64 0.60 0.57 0.56 0.62
Hungary 0.74 0.80 0.81 0.70 0.64 0.60 0.55 0.51 0.46 0.37 0.33 0.30
India 0.17 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.04
Indonesia ... ... ... ... ... 0.80 0.55 0.56 0.61 0.59 0.55 1.00
Israel ... ... ... ... ... 0.87 0.83 0.79 0.76 0.71 0.68 0.69
Korea 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 ...
Latvia ... ... ... 0.66 0.39 0.52 0.28 0.11 0.13 0.25 0.17 ...
Lebanon 0.43 0.59 0.46 0.32 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.14 0.11 0.07 0.20 ...
Lithuania 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.77 0.67 0.50 0.32 0.25 ... ... ...
Malaysia 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 1.00
Mexico 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.85 0.74 0.67 0.61 0.87
Peru ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 0.70 0.60 0.42 ...
Philippines ... ... ... ... ... 0.64 0.58 0.52 0.48 0.55 0.53 0.36
Poland ... ... ... 0.73 0.62 0.46 0.36 0.39 0.32 0.27 0.27 0.30
Russia 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.74 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.06 0.03 ...
Singapore 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.32 0.30 0.34 0.31 0.27 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.28
Slovakia ... 0.24 0.38 0.41 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.38 0.38 ... ... 0.13
Slovenia 0.99 0.95 0.91 0.82 0.72 0.65 0.63 0.63 0.67 0.62 0.53 ...
South Africa ... ... ... ... ... 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.08
Taiwan … 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.01
Thailand 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.14
Turkey ... ... ... ... 0.89 0.55 0.57 0.90 0.87 0.72 0.66 1.00
Uruguay ... ... ... ... ... 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 ...
Venezuela ... ... ... ... ... 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Table 2: Estimated domestic original sin in emerging economies
e
e Complement of the share of long-term domestic debt in local currency with a fixed interest rate in total debt. See the statistical
appendix for the sources and definitions of the data.
f Time-invariant estimates from Hausmann and Panizza (2003) based on a three-year average of data available from JP
Morgan’ s Guide to Local Markets (1998, 2000 and 2002 issues) and reported here pro memoria.  
 
3 Theoretical  determinants 
Determinants at work in shaping the composition of domestic public debt in emerging economies 
are multifaceted. They pertain to the soundness of macroeconomic policies (both on the fiscal and 
monetary front), to sovereign debt management (namely the slope of the yield curve) and to the 
financial environment (including the size of the local investor base as well as political economy 
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3.1 Level of the debt burden  
Public indebtedness gives rise to a time inconsistency problem, as governments may have an 
incentive to reduce debt service costs by reneging on their promise to pay back investors, either 
through inflation, unexpected changes in interest rates, explicit taxation, or outright default. 
However, the maturity and composition of debt can help enforce time consistency. Clearly, issuance 
of inflation-indexed domestic debt reduces incentives to inflate debt obligations away (Leong, 1999). 
Relatedly, Missale and Blanchard (1994) argue that governments may be reluctant to inflate their debt 
away if reputation costs are high. Given that the gain from inflating debt away increases with both 
the level of debt and its maturity, they show that the maximum maturity consistent with a credible 
pledge to price stability decreases with the level of debt. In other words, governments will tend to 
have a shorter maturity debt composition to enhance credibility when the debt burden is high, but 
not necessarily at low levels. In a similar vein, Drudi and Giordano (2000) develop a model where the 
relation between the level and maturity of debt depends on both inflation and default risk. The 
relation is negative at low levels of debt, reflecting lender concerns that debt may be inflated away as 
it becomes larger, but also at high levels, because the default risk premium becomes then too large 
for governments to issue long-term debt. In the intermediate range, the relation is positive, as 
governments try to reduce refinancing risk by lengthening debt maturity. 
3.2 Monetary credibility 
Monetary credibility is conducive to the deepening of domestic debt markets, as suggested by Burger 
and Warnock (2003), who find that the ratio of domestic debt to total (including international) debt is 
higher in countries with lower and less volatile inflation. There is additionally evidence that price 
stability can change the composition of public debt and make it less risky. Indeed, Falcetti and 
Missale (2002) attribute the rise in the share of fixed rate bonds and loans in central government debt 
of twenty OECD countries from the mid-1980s to increased central bank independence, in turn 
reflecting growing investor confidence in long-run price stability. Likewise, Hausmann and Panizza 
(2003) find that monetary credibility, as measured by lower inflation and the imposition of capital 
controls are associated with lower domestic original sin in emerging economies.11 The possible 
persistence of domestic original sin long after disinflation has been achieved suggests, however, that 
monetary credibility is not necessarily restored immediately. Persistence of creditor fears that debt 
might be inflated away can prevent governments from issuing long-term bonds durably, thereby 
pointing to a potential “credibility barrier” (Jeanne, 2003). Turning to capital controls, the negative 
                                                 
11 Exchange rate rigidity is also positively correlated with domestic original sin, although the relationship is not 
robust to the inclusion of capital controls. As Hausmann and Panizza (2003) put it, this suggests that while 
countries that float tend to interfere more with capital flows, once controls are taken into account, their 
exchange rate choice does not matter. 
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correlation with domestic original sin found by Hausmann and Panizza (2003) – albeit in a small 
sample of 21 country-observations – suggests that such restrictions may force residents to hold long-
term domestic currency denominated bonds by narrowing the range of alternative funding or 
investment opportunities. However, this may not be so clear cut. Indeed, the lifting of capital 
controls could also be expected to help reduce domestic original sin, for instance, by contributing to 
a widening of the investor base to foreigners (see also 3.4). 
3.3 Slope of the yield curve 
An important objective of a large number of public debt managers is to ensure that government 
financing needs and payment obligations are met at the lowest possible cost over the medium to long 
run in line with a prudent degree of risk (IMF and World Bank, 2003; see also Missale, 1999, Leong, 
1999, as well as Wolswijk and de Haan, 2005). The trade-off between costs and risks is familiar to 
private sector portfolio managers. Admittedly, there are a number of considerations specific to 
governments which make it difficult to use corporate finance theory as a framework, not least 
because they may have other objectives than wealth maximisation.12 This notwithstanding, many 
countries have explicitly adopted private sector practices in government debt management (Leong, 
1999). In theory, and given the existence of term premia, issuing short-term debt is cheaper than 
issuing long-term debt.13 As a result, taking a short-run cost perspective, an optimal policy is to 
borrow short-term and rollover debt (ibid.). In particular, an upward-sloping yield curve (i.e. a lower 
cost of funding at its short end than at its long end) tends to be associated with higher short-term 
borrowing and, hence, higher original sin. This said, refinancing risk is higher for short-term debt and 
frequent refinancing implies a larger risk of facing higher interest rates. Therefore, governments face 
a trade-off between cheaper funding costs, which tilts the duration towards short-term maturities, on 
the one hand, and refinancing risk, which tilts the duration towards longer-term maturities, on the 
other (Broner, Lorenzoni and Schmukler, 2004).  
However, this is the borrower’s perspective. The investor’s perspective turns the argument on its 
head. Investors are attracted to the highest (risk-adjusted) yields, so that – when the yield curve is 
                                                 
12 The reference to macroeconomic goals in the academic literature clearly distinguishes public debt 
management from private debt management, where cost considerations dominate. Historically, theory has 
indeed focused on the contribution of debt management to monetary policy and stabilisation policy, following 
Tobin (1963) who regarded minimisation of interest costs as secondary, and risk minimisation not playing a 
role at all. More recent developments have focused on the relation between public debt management and fiscal 
policy, drawing on the optimal taxation literature. For instance, tax smoothing is the main government 
objective in Barro’s work on debt management (1999) and, in this respect, it has been shown that the choice of 
debt maturity can play a role in smoothing tax rates (Angeletos, 2002). An important limitation of this literature 
is that it bears little resemblance to the practice of public debt management. Allegedly, the gap between theory 
and practice is “striking” (Wolswijk and de Haan, 2005) and, for this reason, it is not attempted to test here for 
the significance of macroeconomic goals as a determinant of domestic original sin. 
13 This also holds true for debt with a variable interest rate, which is typically indexed to short-term debt. 
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upward-sloping – they are encouraged to invest at its low end, especially when they have long-term 
liabilities. There is indeed strong evidence in the recent period of historically low interest rates that 
the so-called “hunt for yield” has been a key determinant of investment decisions taken by market 
participants (IMF, 2005; ECB, 2005). This in turn encourages the government to issue long-term. As 
a result, focusing on yield considerations only, an upward-sloping yield curve (i.e. higher yields at its 
long end than at its short end) may well be associated with higher long-term borrowing to meet 
investor demand and, hence, lower original sin. 
3.4 Size of the investor base 
A larger local base of institutional investors, as a result of pension system and capital market reforms, 
can contribute to the deepening of domestic debt security markets (IMF, 2002 and 2003). The 
introduction of a fully-funded pension system is of particular relevance in this regard, as pension 
funds have an interest in debt securities carrying low default risk and denominated in domestic 
currency (Borensztein et al., 2004). This may also apply, to some extent, to domestic mutual funds. 
Reflecting these considerations, Claessens, Klingebiel and Schmukler (2003) find that countries with 
larger domestic investor bases have larger domestic currency bond markets, while smaller economies 
rely more on foreign currency bonds. A larger investor based can therefore be expected to contribute 
to lessen domestic original sin. 
3.5 Political economy considerations 
There is evidence that political stability and respect for the rule of law tend to be associated with a 
larger share of domestic public debt in GDP (Borensztein et al., 2004). This is in line with studies 
pointing to a correlation between the size of the domestic bond market and variables pertaining to 
political economy considerations, including rule of law and democracy (Claessens, Klingebiel and 
Schmukler, 2003; Burger and Warnock, 2003). This suggests that democracy is important in the eyes 
of investors, perhaps as it is associated with greater public credibility, better decision-making and 
wider acceptance of the overall policy-making process, including at the macroeconomic level. More 
specifically, Miller (1997) showed that political instability triggers inflation uncertainty and a steeper 
slope of the yield curve, ultimately leading to a reduction in debt maturity. In this respect, political 
stability can therefore be expected to help lower domestic original sin. 
 
4  Methodology and data 
4.1 Core specification 
The econometric analysis raises challenges relating to both the measure of domestic original sin and 
the nature of our dataset. Firstly, given that domestic original sin is by definition bounded between 
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zero and one, estimation has to resort to censored regression methods. This can be done by using the 
tobit model, which is well suited when the dependent variable takes values within fixed bounds, a 
solution retained in previous literature. Secondly, given the panel structure of our dataset, the 
possible existence of unobservable country effects has to be taken into account. Indeed, unobserved 
country heterogeneity would bias standard tobit estimations. To address these issues, we resort to 
random-effects tobit estimation, which is defined as the following combination of linear and 
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where i and t are the country and time dimensions, respectively,    y*
t i,  the measure of domestic 
original sin defined in (1), 
t i, x  a vector of explanatory variables and β  a vector of parameters to be 
estimated. The disturbances are split into both unobserved country effects, noted  i υ , which are i.i.d. 
N(0, 
2 συ ), and panel level effects, noted  t i, ε , which are i.i.d. N(0, 
2 σ ε ) and independent of  i υ . 
To gauge whether random-effects tobit estimation is required, it is useful to calculate the ρ -statistic, 
which measures the contribution of the variance of the disturbances due to country effects to the 














When ρ  is close to zero, random-effect tobit estimation is not significantly different from a standard 
tobit one. Formal comparison between the two models can be achieved by running a likelihood-ratio 
test, where the null hypothesis is that the standard tobit is better suited than the random-effect tobit. 
Moreover, a likelihood-ratio test of the nullity of  i υ , also comparing the tobit estimator and the 
panel estimator, as well as Wald tests on nullity of the estimated parameters can be calculated. 
19
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 560
December 2005 
4.2 Data 
The dependent variable is our estimate of domestic original sin for which we have a sample about 
thirteen times larger than that of Hausmann and Panizza (2003). However, due to missing data for 
some of the explanatory variables, estimations make use of a sample which is about eight times 
larger. Turning to the explanatory variables, the level of the debt burden is proxied by the ratio of the 
general government interest expenditures to GDP, taken from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
(WEO). We include inflation to capture considerations relating to monetary credibility and use the 
annual growth rate of the GDP deflator to that end, also taken from the WEO. Turning to capital 
controls, we resort to a measure of de jure openness often used in the literature, namely the removal 
of restrictions to capital account transactions as published in line E.2 of the IMF's Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements (see, for instance, Fratzscher and Bussière, 2004). We introduce the slope of 
the yield curve to account for cost of issuance and yield attractiveness considerations, which is 
proxied by the spread between the yield on the 5-year Treasury bond and that on the 3-month 
Treasury bill, both in domestic currency, as available from Global Financial Data.14 The size of the 
investor base is proxied by the ratio of gross private savings to GDP, as available from the WEO. 
Political stability is proxied by country ratings of political risk and government stability taken from 
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database (annual averages from monthly observations). 
Turning to the control variables, it is worth noting that a number of countries in the sample were in 
default for at least part of the sample period, including Argentina, Croatia, Russia and Venezuela. The 
potential impact of a restructuring on the composition of these countries’ debt is controlled by a 
dummy variable which equals 1 when a country is considered to be in default by Standard & Poor’s 
(Standard & Poor’s, 2004). Moreover, some countries (including Hong-Kong and Singapore) issue 
little amounts of long-term bonds because they have run large fiscal surpluses. These countries 
authorities have, however, justified official involvement in the development of domestic debt 
markets, which they consider as public goods – when it comes to market infrastructure, in particular 
– to become regional financial centres (IMF, 2002). For this reason, we include a dummy variable 
which equals 1 when a country is a regional financial centre. We additionally include a dummy 
variable which equals 1 from the start of membership negotiations with the European Union (EU) 
onwards. This captures potential disciplinary and credibility effects brought about by the EU 
Accession process in central and eastern European countries, which could have helped reduce the 
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riskiness of their domestic debt composition.15 Last, we also control for regional and time effects in 
the regressions. 
Selected descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3 hereafter. On average, domestic origin sin 
stands at 0.49 in the sample. However, its standard deviation is large (0.34), confirming that the 
phenomenon varies markedly both across countries and time. Debt service accounts for 4% of GDP 
on average and is positively correlated with domestic original sin, as is inflation, whose large standard 
deviation points to bouts of hyperinflation experienced by some of the countries in the sample, 
including Brazil, Russia, Turkey and Venezuela. The slope of the yield curve is upward-sloping on 
average but exhibits substantial volatility as well as a negative correlation with domestic original sin. 
The ratio of private savings to GDP, our proxy for the investor base, stands at about 20% on average 
and is (slightly) negatively correlated with domestic original sin.  
 
Mean Standard deviation
Domestic original sin (DSIN) 0.493 0.346
Debt service to GDP 0.040 0.040
Inflation 0.219 1.291
Slope of the yield curve 0.029 0.300
Investor base 0.200 0.065












5.1 Main results 
Baseline estimates are in Table 4, which reports marginal effects. The marginal effects of the 
explanatory variables on the observed domestic original sin are estimated at their sample means. The 
marginal effects of dummy variables are estimated for a change in these variables from 0 to 1. For the 
sake of comparability between the various specifications, we ensure that the number of observations 
remains the same. The ρ -statistic is significantly positive, confirming that standard tobit estimation – 
which does not take into account unobserved country effects – would be inappropriate. 
In line with Hausmann and Panizza (2003), we find that lack of monetary credibility (i.e. higher 
inflation) is also associated with higher domestic original sin. According to our median point 
estimate, an increase in inflation by 1 percentage point translates into a rise in domestic original sin 
                                                 
15 Moreover, insofar as these countries are perceived by market participants as eventually adopting the euro, 
convergence in interest rates towards euro area levels could have mirrored increasing international investor 
interest in their domestic bond issues. 
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by about 0.8 percentage point. This confirms that progress towards price stability is instrumental in 
alleviating creditor fears that domestic debt could be inflated away and changing its composition 
towards local currency, long-term and unindexed instruments.  
The debt service-to-GDP ratio is positively correlated with domestic original sin, albeit with lower 
levels of statistical significance. According to our median point estimate, an increase in the debt 
service-to-GDP ratio by 1 percentage point is associated with a rise in domestic original sin by about 
1.9 percentage points. As suggested in Missale and Blanchard (1994), this result could reflect 
governments’ efforts to enhance the credibility of their commitment to price stability by shortening 
debt maturity when the debt burden itself becomes too heavy. The result may also confirm that when 
the debt burden is too heavy, the default risk premium becomes too large for governments to issue 
long-term debt, as modelled in Drudi and Giordano (2000).  
The slope of the yield curve is negatively and significantly correlated with domestic original sin. This 
is consistent with an investor perspective, whereby debt maturity lengthens if bond yields are 
sufficiently high relative to short-term rates (i.e. the yield curve is upward-sloping) in order to attract 
investors to the long end of the maturity spectrum. In this respect, our median point estimate 
suggests that a steepening of the yield curve by 100 basis points is associated with a reduction in 
domestic original sin of about 20 basis points.  
Likewise, domestic original sin tends to decrease when the investor base grows, as proxied by an 
increase in the private savings-to-GDP ratio. According to our median point estimate, an increase in 
the investor base by 1 percentage point is associated with a decrease in domestic original sin by 
around 0.8 percentage point. This result indicates that financial deepening underpinned by growing 
private savings as a share of revenue increases potential demand for, and eases issuance of, longer-
term, unindexed, local currency instruments, thereby resulting in a safer domestic debt composition. 
This sharpens the findings of Claessens, Klingebiel and Schmukler (2003) who had found that 
countries with larger domestic investor bases have larger domestic currency bond markets.  
Conversely, unlike Hausmann and Panizza (2003) we find no robust evidence that countries that 
have capital controls also have lower original sin. In many regressions, the corresponding dummy 
variable is insignificant. The difference between our results and theirs is likely to be explained by the 
much larger size of our sample of observations, both in terms of country coverage and time. 
According to one specification, lifting capital account controls is associated with lower domestic 
original sin, which even turns Hausmann and Panizza (2003)’s finding on its head (see row 8 of Table 
4). This could suggest that capital account liberalisation helps reduce domestic original sin by 
widening the investor base to foreigners. 
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The introduction of control dummies does not affect the results. The financial centre dummy is 
positively significant, mirroring the depth of money markets in Singapore, Hong-Kong and Lebanon. 
The sovereign default dummy is negatively signed, possibly reflecting that, upon default, restructuring 
may have led to a rescheduling and lengthening of debt maturity. The EU accession dummy is also 
negatively signed (but mostly insignificant) possibly reflecting that the accession process brings about 
discipline and credibility which help reduce the riskiness of domestic debt composition. When 
controlling for regional effects, it is interesting to note that – relative to the benchmark region (which 
is here emerging Asia) – domestic original sin is close to 30 percentage points higher in Latin 
America and about 25 percentage points lower in the Middle-East and Africa (which include here 
India and South Africa, whose domestic original sin is among the lowest in the sample). The 
introduction of time effects does not affect the results. Interestingly, the year dummies are significant 
in 1995, 1996 and 1998, at the time of the Mexican, Asian and Russian crises. 
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5.2 Robustness checks 
To test the robustness of the results, we first use standard tobit estimation with country fixed effects 
instead of random-effects (Table 5, column 1). The results remain unchanged. 
We also proxy the ability to service debt with an array of macroeconomic indicators drawn from 
Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998), including the ratios of the fiscal balance to GDP, primary balance to 
GDP and government debt to exports (columns 2 to 4). Our estimates suggest that countries with 
sounder public finances tend to have lower domestic original sin. According to our point estimate, an 
increase (lowering) in the fiscal surplus (deficit) of 1 percent of GDP is associated with a decrease in 
domestic original sin by 1.2 percentage point. A similar result holds with the primary balance, albeit 
smaller in magnitude and not statistically significant. This said, the correlation is negative, indeed, 
given that the corresponding t-statistic is above 1 in absolute value. The impact of the government 
debt-to-export ratio is not significant on domestic original sin, which does not come as a surprise, 
given that export proceeds are used to pay back external debt rather than domestic debt.16 The 
estimates for the other determinants are unaltered. 
To further test the robustness of the results, we use alternative definitions of the variables. We 
introduce bond yields and short-term rates separately. In line with an investor perspective, domestic 
original sin is positively correlated with short-term rates and negatively correlated with long-term 
yields (column 5). We replace inflation with the growth of M1 and find again that lack of monetary 
credibility (i.e. an acceleration in money supply growth) is associated with higher domestic original sin 
(column 6). Using a dummy for domestic financial sector liberalisation – taken from Fratzscher and 
Bussière (2004) – to assess the robustness of our results to a change in the definition of the proxy for 
capital controls, we confirm that the latter’s correlation with domestic original sin is not significant 
(column 7). Last, when controlling for inflation and the slope of the yield curve, we do not find that 
greater political stability – as proxied by an increase in the ICRG’s political risk and government 
stability ratings – is associated with lower domestic original sin (columns 8 and 9). 
 
                                                 
16 Exceptions could include countries in the Gulf region, where the bulk of government revenues originate 
from oil exports. These countries are not included in our sample, however. 
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5.3 Endogeneity 
Another challenge that we have not taken into account so far is the potential endogeneity of some of 
our variables. Indeed, the Wu-Hausmann F-test and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman χ2  test suggest that 
inflation and the slope of the yield curve exhibit signs of endogeneity in some of the specifications. 
To correct for endogeneity, we re-estimate (2) using two different techniques: Newey’s two-step 
instrumented tobit estimation and system GMM estimation à la Blundell and Bond (1998).17 
With regard to Newey’s two-step instrumented tobit estimation, we use political risk ratings and the 
legal origin of the financial system as instruments. While political risk is exogenous to domestic debt 
composition, Miller (1997) showed – as aforementioned – that it triggers both inflation uncertainty 
and a steeper slope of the yield curve. The legal origin of the financial system has been extensively 
used in the literature on the finance-growth nexus to correct for endogeneity (see LaPorta et al., 1998 
and Levine et al., 2000). The other (exogenous) variables are also used as instruments in the 
estimations. Turning to system GMM estimation à la Blundell and Bond (1998), it is worth 
acknowledging that the composition of domestic debt cannot be adjusted instantaneously, as it is a 
stock variable. Stocks tend to evolve slowly, implying that domestic original sin is characterised by a 
certain degree of persistence. This calls for explicit modelling of dynamic effects. To this end, 
equation (2) can be rearranged as 
 
t i, t i t i,
p
1 j
j - t i, j t i, ε γ υ βx y y + + + + = ∑
=
ϕ   (3) 
 
where the  j ϕ  are p parameters to be estimated and  t γ  are time effects.  
To estimate (3), the standard Arellano-Bond (1991) ‘first-difference’ GMM estimator suffers from 
finite-sample bias and poor precision when the autoregressive parameter ϕ is moderately large (as 
lagged levels of the series are then poor instruments for their first differences) and the number of 
time series observations is moderately small. This is the present case here: estimations reported 
hereafter confirm that domestic original sin exhibits persistence and 8 years are available for 
estimation on average. Blundell and Bond (1998) show that adding lagged differences of the 
endogenous variables as instruments for equations in levels to the standard lagged levels of the 
endogenous variables as instruments for equations in first differences allows for substantial efficiency 
                                                 
17 We have used two-stage ordinary least squares estimation (with Eicker-Huber-White-sandwich variance 
correction) additionally and obtained similar results (available from the authors). 
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gains in the estimation. By the same token, instrumentation addresses potential endogeneity 
problems that may arise.  
The results are reported in Table 6 hereafter. Columns 1 and 2 report the Newey’s two-step 
instrumented tobit estimates. The explanatory variables have the expected sign and remain 
significant. Exceptions are the debt service-to-GDP ratio, which turns insignificant, and the lifting of 
capital controls dummy, which was already found insignificant previously (column 1). However, 
replacing the debt service-to-GDP ratio by the ratio of the fiscal balance to GDP, a measure of 
ability to service domestic debt, we find that the latter’s coefficient has the expected (negative) sign 
and is significant, while the Wald test rejects exogeneity of the variables to be instrumented (columns 
1 and 2). 
Columns 3 and 4 report system GMM estimates à la Blundell and Bond (1998). Hansen’s test cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the instruments are valid. Arrellano-Bond’s test can reject the absence of 
autocorrelation of order 1 but not of order 2, suggesting that the lagged value of domestic original sin 
suffices to capture dynamic effects. In this respect, the large and significantly positive autoregressive 
coefficient confirms that it is a persistent phenomenon. Still, the estimations suggest that about 10% 
of the composition of domestic debt changes per year in emerging economies. The variables enter 
the regression significantly, with the expected sign. The debt service-to-GDP ratio, however, loses 
significance. Likewise, the measure of ability to service debt, the fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio, loses 
significance (column 4). It is worth recalling that the GMM estimator is mainly used to correct for 
endogeneity, but given its linearity it may not be fully appropriate for a censored dependent variable. 
This may also explain the lack of robustness of this result. The lifting of capital controls and financial 
sector dummies are also insignificant. Long-run elasticities – obtained by dividing the estimated 
coefficients by the inverse of (1 - 0.9) – are larger than those previously obtained, albeit not strictly 
comparable, given that the specification of (3) is linear. Overall, results confirm that, even after 
accounting for endogeneity, the inflation rate, the slope of the yield curve and the size of the investor 
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Table 6: Robustness checks for endogeneity
k,l
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged domestic original sin 0.917 *** 0.915 ***
(27.56) (28.55)
Inflation 5.092 ** 2.851 *** 0.151 ** 0.194 ***
(2.59) (7.59) (2.70) (3.25)
Debt service to GDP -2.487 0.368
(1.06) (1.17)
Fiscal balance to GDP -1.727 ** -0.142
(2.23) (0.83)
Slope of the yield curve -4.740 *** -4.593 *** -0.245 ** -0.282 **
(3.52) (5.36) (2.38) (2.54)
Investor base -1.697 ** -1.519 *** -0.357 * -0.410 **
(2.47) (3.24) (1.88) (2.16)
Lifting of capital controls dummy -0.133 0.001 0.011 0.011
(1.11) (0.01) (0.42) (0.48)
Financial center dummy 0.652 *** 0.604 *** 0.004 -0.005
(4.33) (5.99) (0.13) (0.17)
Constant 0.619 *** 0.521 *** -0.101 ** -0.104 **
(3.69) (4.30) (2.76) (2.36)
Wald test of exogeneity 7.14 ** 7.68 ***
Hasen test of overidentification 11.87 11.06
F-test 486.82 *** 595.35 ***
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) -1.71 * -1.88 *
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) -0.85 -0.90
Number of observations 149 164 138 152
kColumns 1 and 2 report Newey’s two-step instrumented tobit estimates ; Columns 3 and 4 report system GMM à la Blundell and Bond
(1998) estimates.
lAbsolute values of t-statistics in parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of confidence,
respectively.  
 
The experience of Mexico illustrates how the interplay between these determinants bears on 
domestic original sin. For instance, domestic original sin was maximal in Mexico in the mid-1990s 
(i.e. at the time of the financial crisis) but declined by about 40 percentage points thereafter (Chart 3). 
Interestingly, inflation decelerated by around 25 percentage points in the meantime. Taking our core 
elasticity estimate of around 0.8, this could have contributed to reduce – ceteris paribus – domestic 
original sin by about 20 percentage points. Moreover, this decline was accompanied by a sharp 
reduction in the debt service-to-GDP ratio in the order of 14 percentage points. Taking our core 
elasticity estimate of around 1.9, this has been associated – ceteris paribus – with a decrease in 
domestic original sin by about 26 percentage points. In the meantime, the slope of the yield curve 
(i.e. the difference between the long-term bond yield and the 3-month Treasury bill rate) flattened by 
around 200 basis points. Taking our core elasticity estimate of around 0.2, this could have 
contributed to increase – ceteris paribus – domestic original sin by about 40 basis points. Last, the 
investor base shrunk by around 7 percentage points over the period. Taking our core elasticity 
estimate of around 0.8, this could have contributed to increase – ceteris paribus – domestic original 
sin by about 6 percentage points. In total, the overall decrease in domestic original sin resulting from 
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Chart 3: Selected determinants of domestic original sin in Mexico
Source: authors' calculations. All variables expressed in percentage points (left scale), with the exception of DSIN (in percentage, right scale).  
 
6 Conclusions 
This paper has endeavoured to explain why domestic debt composition in some emerging economies 
is risky. To this end, it has carried out a comprehensive empirical analysis of the determinants of the 
so-called “domestic” original sin, the fact that the domestic debt of these economies is often in 
foreign currency, short-term or indexed. It has relied on a large dataset constructed by the authors 
from national sources, which helps address the limitations of the small samples used in previous 
literature.  
The paper has shown that domestic original sin is particularly severe when inflation is lofty, the debt 
service-to-GDP ratio high, the slope of the yield curve inverted and the investor base narrow. These 
results are robust to the inclusion of controls, to specification changes, to various definitions of the 
variables, as well as to the choice of the estimator, including when correcting for endogeneity. An 
exception is the debt service-to-GDP ratio, whose causal impact is not ascertained. Interestingly, 
unlike Hausmann and Panizza (2003), we do not find robust evidence that countries that have capital 
controls also have lower domestic original sin. The difference between our results and theirs is likely 
to be explained by the much larger size of our sample of observations.  
From a policy perspective, our results suggest that sound macroeconomic policies (on the monetary 
front, in particular), attractive long-term yields and a wider investor base are instrumental to 
overcome domestic original sin. In particular, bringing down inflation in a context of diminishing 
debt service and upward-sloping yield curve, together with policies aimed at widening the investor 
base (such as reforms of the domestic capital markets and pension system), help reduce domestic 
debt riskiness and tilt its composition towards safer, long-term, unindexed, local currency 
instruments. The road to redemption is not necessarily long. Emerging economies can – and did so 
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in the past – improve their domestic debt composition swiftly. Estimated elasticities suggest in 
particular that domestic original sin can be reduced substantially. 
Looking ahead, we intend to expand our analysis to corporations and financial institutions, which 
could be of relevance to better understand financial fragilities arising from the private sector – and 
possible differences with the public sector – in particular in emerging Asia. However, given the 
related challenges in terms of data collection, we leave this for future research. 
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